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In his latest book, Michael Devitt rejects Chomsky’s mentalist concep-
tion of linguistics. The case against Chomsky is based on two principal 
claims. First, that we can separate the study of linguistic competence 
from the study of its outputs: only the latter belongs to linguistic inquiry. 
Second, Chomsky’s account of a speaker’s competence as consisiting in 
the mental representation of rules of a grammar for his language is mis-
taken. I shall argue, fi rst, that Devitt fails to make a case for separating 
the study of outputs from the study of competence, and second, that Devitt 
mis-characterises Chomsky’s account of competence, and so his objections 
miss their target. Chomsky’s own views come close to a denial that speak-
er’s have knowledge of their language. But a satisfactory account of what 
speakers are able to do will need to ascribe them linguistic knowledge 
that they use to speak and understand. I shall explore a conception of 
speaker’s knowledge of language that confi rms Chomsky’s mentalist view 
of linguistics but which is immune to Devitt’s criticisms.
We tend to take the speech of the Chinese as inarticulate 
gurgling.
Someone who understands Chinese will recognize lan-
guage in what he hears.
(Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 1)
What enables us to recognize language in the sounds we hear? Cru-
cially, what matters is our knowledge of language: knowledge of which 
sequences of phonemes are words, which word strings are grammatical, 
1 My thinking on these topics was infl uenced by invaluable discussions with 
Noam Chomsky, John Collins, Ophelia Deroy, Dunja Jutronić, Guy Longworth, 
Peter Ludlow, Robert Matthews, Stephen Neale, Paul Pietroski, Georges Rey and of 
course, Michael Devitt, whose consummate good nature and good humour have kept 
things lively and positive through the most robust of exchanges. He has put his case 
vigorously and in detail in a challenging book and should be thoroughly commended 
for doing so. My thanks to all, and my special thanks to Michael Devitt for providing 
several opportunities in Dubrovnik and in print for this exchange.
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and what these words and sentences mean to us. It is this knowledge of 
language that Noam Chomsky takes to be the subject matter of linguis-
tics, and this makes linguistics a branch of psychology:
Linguistics is simply that part of psychology that is concerned with one spe-
cifi c class of steady states, the cognitive structures employed in speaking and 
understanding (Chomsky [1975], 160)
Michael Devitt disagrees. According to Devitt, Chomsky and his fol-
lowers have misconceived their task and are mistaken about the whole 
enterprise of linguistics. In a striking passage from his [2006] book, 
Ignorance of Language, Devitt declares:
I shall argue, a person could be competent in a language without represent-
ing it or knowing anything about it: she could be totally ignorant of it. (Igno-
rance of Language, 5)
He offers two main reasons for this bold claim. First, we do not need to 
study competence to engage in linguistic inquiry: the real subject mat-
ter of linguistics is the output of linguistic competence. Second, those 
who, like Chomsky, mistakenly take linguistics to be concerned with the 
psychological reality of a speaker have an implausible conception of lin-
guistic competence as consisting in propositional knowledge of the rules 
of a grammar. In Devitt’s alternative vision, the linguist theorises about 
the outputs of the speaker’s competence by producing a grammar for the 
sentences speakers produce. Where Chomsky is mistaken, according 
to Devitt, is that he goes on to attribute to the speaker an unconscious 
knowledge of the rules of the language the linguist comes up with. This 
further move is unwarranted, and unnecessary, according to Devitt, since 
speculation about the nature of linguistic competence is a worthy subject 
but one that plays no part in linguistics proper. The linguist can study as-
pects of linguistic reality without referring to any facet of speakers’ com-
petence. Linguistics is simply the study of the symbols or expressions 
of a language.
Much of Devitt’s book is taken up with the critique of the competence 
view he ascribes to Chomsky, but space is given early on to his attempt 
to separate the study of linguistic outputs from the study of the com-
petence that produces them. I shall argue that the attempt to divorce 
the theory of linguistic outputs from the theory of linguistic competence 
fails. And although Devitt is right to reject the specifi c claim that speak-
ers have propositional knowledge of the rules of their language, the re-
jection of this claim misses its target when aimed at Chomsky. A proper 
conception of the speaker’s knowledge of language is immune to Devitt’s 
criticisms, and an account of the extent and nature of this knowledge 
is still needed if we are to explain the linguistic properties of natural 
languages.
1. Devitt’s Rejection of Linguistic Mentalism
The generalisations about language that linguists are interested in 
concern the syntactic structure of language: the structure of complex 
expressions. Natural languages are essentially structured, and an ac-
count of their syntactic structure plays a vital part in any theory of lan-
guage. However, the precise nature and location of syntactic properties 
is far from clear. We know that they cannot be aligned with the acoustic 
properties of speech or the orthographic properties of inscriptions. The 
syntax of a language does not reside on the surface of speech or writing. 
The real issue is where these essential linguistic properties are to be 
found. What sort of facts are linguists describing when they specify the 
syntactic properties of a language? Our answer to this question should 
have consequences for how we conceive of language and its place in 
nature.
The trouble is that people often begin with an a priori conception of 
what a language is and struggle to accommodate syntactic facts, or even 
the range of evidence linguists draw upon in forming syntactic hypoth-
eses. We have had linguists and philosophers of language who were be-
haviourists, some who have been Platonists, and, of course, there are 
mentalists, like Chomsky. Behaviourism fared very badly by restricting 
the type of evidence that could count in favour of a linguistic hypoth-
esis. Platonism left unclear what relation there is between languages 
conceived as independently existing abstract objects and the evidence 
we can elicit from speakers.2 By contrast, Chomsky’s view is that the 
real subject of linguistic inquiry is the syntactic structure of language 
–the essential properties and relations that make language language. 
And in bringing syntactic facts into focus he concludes that much of our 
pre-theoretical notion of language is simply irrelevant to the scientifi c 
study of language. The reality of language consists in the underlying 
facts that give form and character to the linguistic items we perceive 
ourselves and others to be producing. Chomsky’s mentalism consists in 
his taking these underlying facts to be in the mind/brains of speaker/
hearers.
Devitt keenly contests this view. He is strongly attached to the folk 
conception of a language, while at the same time ready to accept the 
fi ndings of generative grammar with its postulations of syntactic struc-
ture. At fi rst, this appears an unworkable option since the descriptions 
generative grammarians give of syntactic structure depart radically 
from the recognisable descriptions of grammar given by the folk. How-
ever, Devitt thinks of the linguist as theorising about the observable 
bits of language we ordinarily encounter in order to arrive at hypoth-
eses about the syntactic properties possessed by those ordinary items of 
language. Two questions arise: (a) What is his conception of language as 
the observable evidence for linguistics?; and, (b) What aspects of reality 
are linguists describing in their detailed hypotheses about the syntactic 
structure of expressions?
2 The Platonist also faces the problem of defi ning the actual language relation 
between speakers and their languages. See Smith [2006a] for a discussion of this 
problem.
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The answer to (a) is the folk notion of language. The folk notion sees lan-
guages as out there, existing independently of us; a language is something 
all around us that we gradually become immersed in and avail ourselves 
of in order to express and communicate our thoughts. The philosophical 
interest, and the philosophical diffi culty, is to see whether this notion of 
language makes sense, and if not, how it should be revised.
The cunning answer to (b) is the claim that linguistics is about lin-
guistic reality, and that the hypothesised syntactic properties of ordi-
nary language are part of that linguistic reality. This is fi ne as far as 
it goes. But it is precisely the nature of that reality which is at issue. We 
cannot just assume linguistic reality as a given any more than we can as-
sume mathematical or moral reality as a given in a world of matter and 
causes. The task is to understand the true nature of linguistic forms and 
to understand how they can be accommodated in the natural world. We 
need a proper conception of linguistic reality in order to understand the 
ultimate nature of language. Is it, for example, a psychological matter of 
what is represented in the mind of speakers? Is it a matter of communal 
practices? Is it a set of conventions in a community? Is it a set of abstract 
objects existing independently of all speakers? All these are candidates 
and it would be surprising if those who study language and its linguistics 
properties did not have a view about the nature of language and linguistic 
properties. Somehow Devitt both wants to postpone discussion of this 
issue and attack Chomsky’s mentalist stance.
Devitt’s case against the mentalist conception of linguistics begins 
by denying that the study of linguistics is the study of a speaker’s com-
petence. Instead it is taken to be the study of the outputs of that com-
petence, where:
The theory of outputs has a certain epistemic and explanatory priority over 
the theory of competence (ibid. 2006)
The claim of independent accessibility to linguistic outputs matters be-
cause it is taken to support large conclusions about the nature of lan-
guage and the objects of linguistic inquiry. It is the basis for rejecting 
Chomsky’s claim that linguistics is the study of certain states of com-
petent speakers—states of the mind/brain of the speaker—and for pro-
moting Devitt’s alternative vision of linguistics as the study of linguistic 
reality.
But what priority do outputs have? And what sort of independent ac-
cess can we have to them? Can we establish facts about a language inde-
pendently of facts about its speakers? Devitt seems to imagine we can, 
making the easy assumption that what we are talking about is just there 
anyway, knowable without knowing anything about the speakers who 
produce it. Of course, were there no competent speakers there would 
be no language, as Devitt readily admits: ‘language is what the compe-
tence produces’ (31). Language exists because we do: because creatures 
with minds like ours produce it and because it can be acquired from other 
such minded creatures that continue to use it. But it is as if, once we have 
put bits of language into the air, so to speak, they stay there and take on 
a life of their own, rendering them independent of any, and perhaps all, 
speakers’ minds, whatever dependence they had on minds to begin with. 
Competence is required to produce the outputs that linguistics studies, 
so Devitt is not a Platonist. But once the outputs have been produced 
they become readily available linguistic tokens and a source of evidence 
for the linguist, who need not allude to, or know anything about, the 
nature of the linguistic competence that produced them. The outputs 
which serve as the evidence for linguists can be observed and studied 
independently of speakers’ psychology.
Accounts of this kind involve what Chomsky calls an E-language—
that is, a language:
Externalised…in the sense that the construct is understood independently 
of the properties of the mind/brain ([1986], 20)
They can be studied and understood independently the mind brain, 
even though languages are not independent of speakers’ mind/brains in 
origin. For Devitt, the study of competence must go via the study of lan-
guages: ‘whenever there is a linguistic competence there has to be such 
a language…the language is what the speaker is competent in’ (ibid. 
31), and by studying the properties of the language we bring to light the 
object our linguistic competence has to grapple with. The idea seems to 
be that competence gets to grips with an already existing language—the 
language of our community, perhaps. Thus competence cannot consti-
tute the linguistic data, as Chomsky thinks. 
By my lights this is a strange metaphysical picture. What direct or 
unfi ltered access do we have to linguistic reality? How do we select lin-
guistically signifi cant items for scrutiny without ourselves being compe-
tent speakers who perceive speech sounds as meaningful? The linguistic 
facts are not simply unproblematically accessible. Where exactly do we 
fi nd facts about the complex arrangements of expressions standing in re-
lations of, say, c-command to one another? Not in the sounds, that’s for 
sure. But here, of course, one is meant to be contented with the unin-
formative platitude that in linguistics we are describing linguistic real-
ity. Such a response immediately invites further questions. What does 
linguistic reality consist in, what kinds of things make up that reality, 
and in virtue of what does that language have the linguistic properties 
it has? However, we are prevented from asking these questions because, 
according to Devitt, they are further questions that need not concern the 
linguist. This is surprising, for surely methodological issues ought to be 
of concern both to the philosopher of language and the linguist. Surely, 
linguists are entitled to ask what the objects of inquiry are, and to ex-
pect an informative answer. After all, philosophers would hardly settle 
for being told in their discipline that ethics is the study of ethical real-
ity, aesthetics the study of aesthetic reality, or, for that matter, that re-
ligious study is the study of religious reality? The nature of ethical and 
aesthetical properties is a highly contentious issue, and an important 
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topic in philosophy. And a similar set of issues arises for the nature of 
language and linguistic properties. Questions about the status of these 
properties cannot be evaded by an uninformative platitude.
However, Devitt has another way with the methodological issues. 
When push comes to shove he acknowledges that the syntactic proper-
ties of a language may be ‘largely determined by the mind/brain’ (26) 
but he thinks there is room to resist the view that linguistics is about 
the mental even if the linguistic properties of symbols are determined 
by the mind/brain. For: 
Even if symbols had their properties in virtue of certain mental facts that 
would not make the theory of those symbols about those facts and so would 
not make the theory part of psychology.(ibid. 40)
Why is this? Well, to think a theory was about certain facts just because 
they determine its domain of inquiry would be like accepting the follow-
ing general conclusion:
Every theory—economic, psychological, biological, etc.—would be about 
physical facts and part of physics because physical facts ultimately deter-
mine everything. (Ibid. 40)
But this trivialising response is wholly inadequate. It may be true that 
real entities have the properties they do in virtue of the layout and ar-
rangement of all the physical facts there are. Nevertheless, generalisa-
tions in the special sciences concern different levels of organisation of 
the physical world and have their own proprietary levels of description 
of the phenomena. The special sciences are about groupings of entities 
the laws of those special sciences apply to. As Devitt himself acknowl-
edges: ‘A special science does not lose its own domain because that do-
main supervenes on another’(ibid. 40) . That’s right, and it is still a good 
question for each special science what entities its domain encompasses. 
It turned out, for example, that chemistry could be reduced to physics, 
but so far as we know, the generalisations in biology cannot be captured 
without loss by the laws of physics. And this is not because biology is 
about non-physical stuff. Rather, it is because the phenomena biologists 
are interested in, and over which they generalise, lack integrity or uni-
fying features at the level of description physicists address. Still, we can 
ask whether biology concerns properties of entities in the natural world, 
or whether its fi ndings concern some mysterious élan vital.3 Similarly, 
we can ask whether linguistics concerns physical properties of noise 
emitted by speakers, mental representations of linguistic structure, or 
something else. This remains a good question.
We can and should ask what the generalisations of linguistics are 
about, [and] what facts make them true, when true. We need to address 
these questions in order to contest Devitt’s own speculations about the 
nature of linguistic phenomena. For in spite of his injunction not to 
ask in virtue of what questions, Devitt cannot refrain from giving his 
3 I take it none of us thinks it is the latter. 
own answer, in terms of spatio-temporal, physical entities. Linguistic 
entities, or symbols of the sort linguists study, are, according to Devitt, 
‘parts of the spatio-temporal physical world’. But just which parts of the 
physical world are they? He goes on, ‘our theory can abstract …from a 
range of properties of the outputs—for example, form of script and pitch 
of sound—focusing simply on the syntactic properties we are interested 
in’ (24, italics mine). The problem should by now be clear. Linguists are 
concerned with the syntactic properties of symbols. Symbols are spatio-
temporal parts of physical reality. But syntactic properties are not to 
be found among the spatio-temporal parts of physical reality, as Devitt 
knows. Devitt is admirably clear about the importance of the theoretical 
entities posited in syntax:
A triumph of generative grammar has been to make us appreciate how much 
of the syntax of a sentence is not explicit, “how unrevealing surface structure 
may be as to underlying deep structure”; “surface similarities may hide un-
derlying distinctions of a fundamental nature” (Chomsky 1965: 24). Consider 
empty categories, for example: “An empty category…is a constituent that has 
no phonological substance associated with it; it is inaudible in speech, and 
invisible in the standard orthography” (J. D. Fodor 1989: 156). Consider also 
the scope of quantifi ers. This scope is often not explicit on the surface and yet is 
revealed at the level of logical form or LF, the level of syntactic structure that 
most concerns us (1.3)…Considerations of this sort lead Stephen Neale to go 
further: “rather than saying that (30) [‘Every poet respects some sculptor’] is 
an ambiguous sentence, really we should say that (30) is the surface represen-
tation of two distinct sentences…that share an S-Structure representation and 
in fact look and sound alike” (1993: 119).’ (ibid. 154)
Syntactic properties—the ones we are most interested in—should pres-
ent diffi culties for Devitt’s conception of linguistic entities as external, 
physical tokens. And yet he remains utterly blithe:
Syntactic properties are ones that refl ect a token’s relations to other tokens 
in the language; they are functional properties and extrinsic to the repre-
sentation. Although formally so different, a written and spoken token of (1) 
might share all their syntactic properties. Sentences that “look different” 
can be syntactically alike. Formal differences are one thing, syntactic differ-
ences, another. (ibid. 154)
Why is Devitt so optimistic that syntax can be easily accommodated by 
a brute physical view of language? Well it is because syntactic proper-
ties are not themselves intrinsic, or brute-physical properties of physi-
cal tokens. They are ‘extrinsic’, ‘non-obvious’, ‘abstract’, ‘higher-order’, 
or ‘relational’ properties; and properties of physical sound tokens, pre-
sumably. Yet despite this admission, Devitt claims that linguists study 
‘physical sentence tokens’. The use of ‘sentence’ in the context of physi-
cal tokens is strange given that Devitt is willing to concede that a sen-
tence is something with a syntactic structure: a hierarchical not a linear 
structure. Much of that structure is inexplicit: it may contain relations 
between displaced elements and phonetically null elements not detect-
able in the physical world. And while syntactic properties and relations 
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can be properties of public strings, or uttered sounds, they are not pub-
lic properties of those strings or sounds. They are not observable or 
intrinsic properties of the speech sounds speakers produce. Nothing like 
PRO, trace or VP-ellipsis are realised in the surface string. Given that 
Devitt accepts the fi ndings and generalisations of syntactic theory that 
make appeal to such entities necessary, his talk of ‘physical sentence 
tokens’ is at best misleading. And so too is his claim that linguists study 
tokens. The very idea that it is tokens—unrepeatable, dateable, physi-
cal events—that they study is so implausible that Devitt seeks to cover 
over this inconvenient fact by retreating to ‘as if’ talk:
It is often convenient to talk of the objects posited by these [linguistic] theo-
ries as if they were types not tokens, as if they were abstract Platonic objects, 
but this need be nothing more than a manner of speaking (ibid. 26)
We may wonder whether is it ‘talking about linguistic types’ or ‘talk-
ing “as if” we were talking about linguistic types’ that is the manner of 
speaking. What can it even mean to say linguists study tokens? Perhaps 
we can make sense of what Devitt has in mind by taking acoustic sig-
nals to be physical tokenings of the syntactically-structured sentence 
types that linguists actually study. If so, how are the particular acoustic 
tokens typed? (Note that some acoustic sequences can be typed by more 
than one sentence structure, but let us put this complication aside.) We 
are told that ‘physical sentence tokens’ are ‘governed by a system of 
rules’ (26):
Something counts as a particular sentence, has its particular syntactic 
structure, in virtue of the particular structure rules that govern it (24, italics 
mine.)
This won’t do. Linguistic structure rules do not apply to physical sound 
properties: they apply to elements in a structure; elements that carry 
information about grammatical roles and categories, including phoneti-
cally null elements in the syntax. It is these elements that are said to be 
represented in the minds of speakers. Devitt misses the thrust of Chom-
sky’s mentalist’s claim because he takes the mentalist to be saying that 
linguistic symbols have their properties in virtue of certain mental facts, 
as if mental facts gave rise to the fact of symbols having those proper-
ties, or as if the symbols got their properties by standing in relations 
to mental facts. But the mentalist’s claim is that the linguistic sym-
bols themselves are mental representations. A sound is only a linguistic 
item (symbol) if speakers, or their underlying linguistic systems, as-
sign phonological, syntactic and semantic properties to it: and these are 
not properties in the world but properties mentally represented in the 
minds of speakers. This is why a sound is heard as a piece of language. 
Without the cognitive wherewithal to represent sounds as symbols they 
would be heard as no more than inarticulate gurgling or throat clear-
ing. Symbols are what we, as linguistically competent individuals, take 
sounds and marks to be, by hearing or reading into them the linguistic 
signifi cance they have for us. 
What is the alternative supposed to be? Where in the physical world 
could we locate a physical sentence token of (1) which has the structure 
represented by (2)?
(1) John seemed to think Peter promised to leave
(2) John1 seemed [t1 to think Peter2 promised PRO2 to leave]
The structure rules that govern the sentence we take (1) to express ap-
ply to the represented structure shown in (2), a structure remote from 
surface form. This same syntactic structure—a type—could be assigned 
to a variety of sounds made by different speakers, or to written marks, 
or to instances of sign language. In what sense, then, are linguists 
studying physical tokens rather than linguistic types? 
Towards the end of the book, Devitt eventually addresses the right 
question by asking:
In virtue of what does a sentence have its syntactic structure, whether ex-
plicit or not? What makes it the case that a particular token, for example a 
token of (1), has the structure it has, perhaps the structure revealed by (2)…? 
This question does not seek a description of the structure that the sentence 
has––a description that linguists have been so successful at providing––but 
rather an explanation of its having that structure. Since this structure along 
with the sentence’s word meanings determines the sentence’s meaning, this 
explanation is part of an explanation of the sentence’s meaning. It is part of 
an explanation of in virtue of what the sentence has whatever meaning it 
has. (ibid. 55; numbers for examples changed)
The appeal to meaning is meant to help explain why a string has the 
structure it has. Devitt takes it that structures and meanings are made 
for each other. But sentence meaning depends systematically on form 
and, a fortiori, the meaning comprehended depends systematically on the 
syntactic structure of the string we assign to it. We see semantics through 
syntax, as David Wiggins once put it. So where is this perceived structure? 
In virtue of what does a string of sounds or marks have the structure the 
linguist describes? We are offered nothing more to go on. And where more 
detail is needed about how Devitt thinks about the outputs of linguistic 
competence—the putative objects of linguistic inquiry—he tells us:
The theory of them is as much concerned with real-world objects as the theo-
ries of horseshoes [and] bee dances (26). 
Is there something here to cling to? Let us examine the ideas a little 
further.
2. Can Language Really Be Like 
Honey Bee Foraging or Horseshoes?
Unfortunately, much of the argument for separating the study of lin-
guistic competence from the study of its outputs—and for the indepen-
dent existence of its outputs—works by analogy, and so the claim is 
only as good as the analogies themselves. The fi rst analogy concerns the 
blacksmith and the horseshoes he produces. The second is an analogy 
between language and the foraging Honey Bee’s dance. Let us look at 
these in turn.
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The competent blacksmith makes horseshoes. These products lie 
around as parts of the world existing independently of the blacksmith. 
We could come across them without knowing how they were produced, 
or even what they were for. Once produced, horseshoes take on a life of 
their own and we can study them without knowing anything about the 
complex mental and physical properties the blacksmith needed to make 
them. For Devitt, the same is true of linguistic entities and the compe-
tence of those who produce them.
The analogy is deeply fl awed. It is true that once horseshoes have 
been produced, they can exist independently of the blacksmith. We could 
come upon them without knowing what they were, and begin to fash-
ion all sorts of hypotheses about them. Even if we did recognise them 
we could describe and study horseshoes without knowing how to make 
them. But it cannot be like that with the sentences of language. In order 
to come across them, or recognise them at all, we need to be linguisti-
cally competent users of a language who know what they are. Without 
linguistic competence such bits of ‘linguistic reality’ would be invisible 
or inaudible: they would not be encountered as linguistic but just as 
noise. We only recognise speech events as including sentences when we 
have the competence to speak and understand. Without understanding 
we could not tell the difference between inarticulate gurgling and lan-
guage. Even if we speak a language, how could we tell, when listening to 
a foreign speaker, whether he was actually speaking Russian or merely 
making noises that sounded like Russian (or sounded as we imagined 
Russian to sound) unless we understood Russian? The data of linguis-
tics—the bits of linguistic reality Devitt talks about—are only data for 
those who recognise them as such by exercising their linguistic compe-
tence. The sentences––syntactically structured strings—that we see or 
hear depend on the competence we have. Unlike horseshoes, linguistic 
data are not out there independently of the competence of those who 
seek them out. They are there for those with the linguistic competence 
to comprehend them. Study the competence and you will fi nd the sen-
tences it carves out of the ambient sound stream.
The second crucial analogy for Devitt is the Honey Bee Dance, de-
scribed by von Frisch as a ‘language’. According to von Frisch, the for-
aging honey bee fi nds a food source and returns to the hive to perform 
a dance with waggling and turns of its body. The other bees observe 
this dance and use these movements as a set of instructions about the 
direction and distance of the food source they then fl y to. Once again, 
Devitt is talking about events in the physical world that can be observed 
without knowing anything of their signifi cance, what these movements 
are for, and how other bees make use of them. It is precisely this state 
of affairs that allowed von Frisch to speculate about the signifi cance of 
what he saw and to describe the bee dance as a ‘language’. 
Although Devitt lays great weight on this analogy, the “language” 
hypothesis is highly controversial and has very little empirical credibil-
ity these days. Work by Adrian Wenner repudiates many of von Frisch’s 
fi ndings and strongly suggests that the bees are much more likely to use 
odour signals to direct each other to the food. The waggling may turn 
out to be an effi cient method for the foraging bee to spread odour to the 
others. The lead bee most probably leaves odour trails along the route 
for the other bees to follow.4 
There are many weaknesses in von Frisch’s experiments and a lack 
of adequate controls. Many of his predictions have turned out to be 
false, and in a recent survey paper discussing the controversy, Subhash 
Kak reports that:
The 1980’s saw a renewed challenge to the dance theory (Rosin 1980, 1988). 
In the face of evidence against the original dance language hypothesis of 
von Frisch, even its proponents now grant the locale-odor mechanism a role 
in the communication amongst bees. But, as argued by Rosin (1988), these 
proponents do not, amongst themselves, agree on a ‘single’ dance language. 
Says Rosin: ‘There are numerous contradictory versions of the ‘dance lan-
guage’ hypothesis that concur only in the belief that somewhere, somehow, 
some honey bees use ‘dance language’ information, but disagree on practi-
cally anything else.” (Kak [1991])
The availability of negative evidence, the lack of replication of Von 
Frisch’s results, the proliferation of different versions of the dance sig-
nals and their meanings, the counter-evidence for odour-based tests all 
suggest that Von Frisch’s ‘language’ hypothesis has little going from 
it. An odour mechanism that explained the data would not carry the 
heavy and implausible commitment to the bee’s brain having an un-
known cognitive mechanism able to process the variety of information 
allegedly displayed in the different bee dance signals. Unlike language, 
the bee dance can be observed without any idea of the signifi cance of the 
activity we are looking at. But equally, the best hypothesis of what we 
are looking at is unlikely to have anything to do with representational 
language. For Devitt’s purposes the analogy proves doubly unhelpful. 
When called upon to give a positive construal of properties of lin-
guistic structure such as gapping, c-command, the location of empty 
categories like trace and PRO, we saw that Devitt takes these to be 
non-obvious properties of physical sound tokens. The elements in lin-
guistic structures and their relations are not to be equated with brute-
physical entities. These non-obvious properties of sounds or signs are 
‘higher-order’ relational properties (see 27). Resorting to another anal-
ogy, Devitt tells us they are like Michael Devitt’s (amusingly) ‘non-obvi-
ous’ property of being Australian. This is a relational, not an intrinsic, 
property of a person. Similarly, in the language case, physical sound 
tokens will be said to have non-obvious relational properties. However, 
there is a considerable difference between the cases. In the former there 
is no mystery. A spatio-temporal path can be traced between Michael 
4 See Wenner [2002]; Wells and Wenner [1973]; Wenner [1967]; Wenner and 
Wells [1990]. I am very grateful to Ophelia Deroy for drawing this research to my 
attention. 
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Devitt and a large continent in the Pacifi c Ocean. But what are the 
relata in the analogous linguistic case? Linguistic properties are not 
intrinsic properties of physical tokens. A sound’s having these linguis-
tic properties consists in there being a relation between the sound and 
features of a speaker’s mind/brain. For this is the only candidate for the 
other relatum, as Devitt himself seems to admit. As we saw, phonemic 
sequences, grammatical categories, and the dependence of some items 
on others in the string, are not to be found at the physical end of this 
relation. All the fi ne-grained linguistic detail and richness, which gives 
sounds their place in a language, are to be found in the representa-
tions in the speaker’s mind/brain. Why not then concede that it is these 
domain-specifi c features of a speaker’s cognitive organisation, rather 
than the brute-physical tokens, that the linguist most needs to focus 
on? Moreover, it is hardly an alternative to mentalism to hear that the 
non-obvious properties that make sounds parts of language are part of 
a speaker’s psychology. Sure, we can say that physical tokens of sound 
have linguistic properties, but crucially they do so because they stand in 
important relations to the psychological states of language users. Which 
linguistic properties tokens have, and how speakers come to recognise 
them, concerns the performance and competence of the speaker-hearer, 
and not just the noises they emit at different places and times. 
3. Devitt’s Diffi culties With Competence
Coming at things from a different angle, why does Devitt struggle to 
resist the inclusion of linguistic competence in the subject matter of 
linguistics? After all, if foregoing discussion is right, he will have to con-
cern himself with speaker’s competence in order to recognise physical 
sound tokens as having the linguistic properties that make them part of 
language. What is more, if the leading practitioners in linguistics take 
themselves to be studying speaker’s competence, why not leave it to the 
experts to settle the subject matter of their own discipline? The anxiety 
is all about maintaining a view of language as external to the minds of 
speakers, and resisting Chomsky’s conception of language as part of 
the mind/brain of speakers. According to Chomsky: ‘language has no 
objective existence apart from its mental representation’ in the mind/
brain5; according to Devitt, ‘linguistic competence is in the mind/brain, 
the language is not.’ (23) However, as we have just seen, Devitt fails to 
make out the case that linguistics concerns spatio-temporal tokens of 
the physical world rather than being as Chomsky thinks ‘mentalistic, 
since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual 
behaviour.’ (Chomsky [1965], 4). As we saw, Devitt is unable to charac-
terise the outputs of linguistic competence as linguistic save in relation 
to a speaker’s competence. And if it is conceded not only that ‘language 
is what the competence produces’ (31) but that language is inseparable 
5 Chomsky [1972], 169 fn.
from that competence, the only remaining issue concerns the right ac-
count of that competence. For if Devitt were right and Chomsky was 
mistaken about the nature of linguistic competence it would not follow 
that he was mistaken in his mentalist view of the subject matter of lin-
guistics. But is Chomsky’s account of linguistic competence mistaken? 
Devitt certainly thinks so. The question is whether Chomsky holds the 
view that Devitt spends most of his time attacking.
4. Devitt’s View of Chomsky on Competence
According to Devitt, Chomsky thinks that the rules of language lin-
guists posit in syntactic theories are psychologically real: they are the 
rules speakers embody by mentally representing them. What is more, 
‘there is no signifi cant evidence for this thesis, and given what else we 
know, it is implausible’ (9) The key thesis concerns the representation 
of rules. According to Devitt:
Chomsky puts the claim about representation with characteristic fi rmness: 
“there can be little doubt that knowing a language involves internal repre-
sentation of a generative procedure” (1991a: 9; see also 1965: 25; 1975a: 304; 
1980a: 201; 1980b: 9; 2000a: 50). (Devitt [2006], 4 )
In response, Devitt tells us that we should:
doubt that speakers must have propositional knowledge of the language or 
that they must have representations of linguistic rules in the language fa-
culty or anywhere else in the mind. (ibid. 5)
Notice the discrepancy between Devitt’s rejection and what Chomsky 
is actually saying. Chomsky says that knowing a language ‘involves 
internal representation of a generative procedure’ (my italics), a gen-
erative procedure that determines the expressions of the language and 
their various linguistic properties. He does not say a speaker/hearer has 
propositional knowledge of the rules of the language. Chomsky is noto-
riously wary of talk of knowledge and the problems philosophers see 
it as giving rise to: that was why he proposed the use of the neologism 
‘cognize’ instead of ‘know’ to indicate that linguists were concerned with 
a rather special cognitive state. To say, as Chomsky does, that some 
special part of the speaker’s cognitive apparatus represents a genera-
tive procedure is a subtly different and noticeably less committal claim 
than the one Devitt attributes to Chomsky. 
However, I sympathize with Devitt. Chomsky is notoriously diffi cult 
to pin down on what he means by a speaker having internalized a gram-
mar for his language. At one stage, Chomsky says:
It seems reasonably clear, both in principle and in many specifi c cases, how 
unconscious knowledge issues in conscious knowledge...it follows by compu-
tations similar to straight deduction. (Chomsky [1986], 270)
The statement is misleading. For if items of conscious knowledge 
fl owed from unconscious knowledge in a manner similar to deduction, 
it would suggest that unconscious knowledge was propositional in form: 
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something having the right format to sustain logical relations. Though 
Chomsky’s picture is surely different. Unconscious, information-bearing 
states of the language faculty give rise to conscious knowledge that is 
immediately refl ected in the speaker’s intuitive linguistic judgements, 
but there is no reason to think, and it is surely implausible to think, 
that such unconscious knowledge takes exactly the same form that the 
theorists’ pronouncements take. In the book, Knowledge of Language, 
from which the above quote comes, Chomsky is careful to distinguish 
between a speaker knowing that rule R is a rule of his language, and 
his knowing rule R. The mistake of supposing that the speaker repre-
sents the theory the linguist comes up with is due to an assumption that 
the speaker somehow embodies the information laid out by the theo-
rist. This cannot be Chomsky’s view. But it was Quine’s. It is Quine’s 
thought that the learner and the theorist must be in the same predica-
ment and that therefore the learner will have the same (behaviourist) 
data to go on as the theorist who tries to provide an account of the lan-
guage. Both face the same evidence from which they have to arrive at 
an understanding of the language. For Quine both must be behaviour-
ists, and he suspects that mentalists assume that the language learner 
has knowledge, albeit unconscious, of the theory the linguist constructs. 
However, Chomsky distinguishes the project facing the linguist and fac-
ing the child acquiring a fi rst language. The linguist is trying to work 
out what native endowment the child must be equipped with in order 
to acquire natural language on exposure to a course of experience. The 
child, notice, is doing no such thing. The child is simply exposed to that 
course of experience and on the basis of its native endowment, some-
how maps the course of experience onto an internalised grammar that 
equips it to speak and understand. The theorist will try to identify the 
nature of that native endowment, the principles that govern the choice 
of resulting grammar, and attempt to understand the way the child’s 
resulting grammar grows out of the initial structural properties the 
language faculty respects on exposure to the primary linguistic data. 
And notice, one again, the generalisations the linguist frames about the 
child’s grammar need not be framed in the form in which they are ob-
served by the grammar. The linguist’s theory is a model of the grammar 
not a specifi cation of the form of its encoding by the speaker.
It is easy to agree with Devitt that we should doubt whether speakers 
have ‘propositional knowledge’ of the rules of their language, or repre-
sent rules as formulated by linguists’ theories of their languages. But why 
should anyone think this is what the Chomskian is committed to? The 
theorist tries to state (partly propositionally) what the speaker knows, 
but not in the form in which the speaker knows it. The theory does not at-
tempt to show how such knowledge is put to use. If accounts which do try 
to do these things are the target of Devitt’s book then it is simply fails to 
address Chomsky’s position. Be that as it may, the key issue is whether 
a speaker really could ‘be competent in a language without representing 
it or knowing anything about it’; whether she really could ‘be totally ig-
norant of it’ (5), as Devitt asserts. Were we to consider a speaker’s knowl-
edge as consisting in the representation of rules of her language—her 
internalisation of the rules as formulated by the linguist—we could agree 
that the speaker does not have knowledge in anything like that form. 
But what would that tell us about more plausible mentalist claims? De-
vitt’s boldly stated conclusion is surely meant to apply to all mentalistic 
or Chomskian claims. If not, it’s hard to see why anyone should get so 
excited about ‘the ignorance claim’. I shall argue that Devitt’s criticisms 
leave the central tenets of Chomsky’s mentalist programme intact, and, 
as we have seen, Devitt’s own views about the nature of language and the 
objects of linguistic inquiry go badly awry. Similarly, his thoughts about 
how a competence that involves neither knowledge nor representations of 
the language enables us to produce and comprehend indefi nitely many 
sentences are wildly speculative.
5. Devitt’s Dialectical Strategy: the Real and the Unreal
It must be said that Devitt’s dialectical strategy is puzzling. It appears 
to be as follows: suppose Chomsky were saying that competent speakers 
of a language had propositional knowledge of its rules; look what a mess 
he would get into. What should we conclude from that? The natural re-
post is to say: why suppose this is the right or the only way to interpret 
Chomsky, why attribute to him such an implausible view? Why is no real 
attempt made to make out a more plausible and less straw man version 
of Chomsky’s position? I sympathise with Devitt’s diffi culties in trying 
to arrive at a consistent interpretation of Chomsky on the psychological 
reality of grammars. Nevertheless, Chomsky has made clarifi catory com-
ments designed to defuse criticism, and these remarks should be heeded. 
Devitt does concede that ‘we cannot be confi dent that Chomsky is using 
‘represent’ in the familiar and relatively clear sense that I have endorsed 
(which is also the sense relevant to RTM).’ And he insists that ‘interpret-
ing Chomsky is not my major concern’; the major concern being ‘to evalu-
ate a variety of ways in which language might be psychologically real in 
the speaker’ (7). The crucial questions should be whether linguistics is 
part of psychology and whether linguistic rules are psychologically real 
or linguistic facts are psychological facts. Yet, despite this broader set of 
concerns and the declaration that he takes ‘no fi rm stand on this matter of 
interpretation’ (7), Devitt goes on to assume that, ‘the natural interpreta-
tion attributes RT to Chomsky’ and he proceeds as though this were not 
only the correct but also the only position worth considering. Devitt does 
this not only to reject what he takes to be Chomsky’s position but also to 
reject the claim that ‘language might be psychologically real in the speak-
er’. The trouble is that the interpretation fi xed upon is the least plausible 
construal of the mentalist’s claim; one which even leads Devitt into con-
fusion. For instance, things go very badly wrong in this passage: 
446 B. Smith, Why We Still Need Knowledge of Language  B. Smith, Why We Still Need Knowledge of Language 447
The rules of the language are represented in the speaker’s language faculty; 
the language is psychologically real because the theory of the language - its 
grammar - is psychologically real. Indeed, a language simply is this system 
of rules encoded in the mind. Those represented rules are the reality that a 
grammar is theorizing about. If that interpretation is wrong then Chomsky 
must hold that a language is a system of rules embodied somehow in the 
language faculty without being represented. Then those embodied rules are 
the reality that a grammar is theorizing about.’ (7)
Let us suppose rules are mentally represented by the language faculty. 
We are then told that the language has psychological reality because 
the theory of it—its grammar—is psychologically real: i.e. mentally rep-
resented. But why should this follow? Even if the linguist’s theory of a 
language were mentally represented that would not show that language 
was psychologically real; we could still be theorising about an external 
language. This is the view advocated by Gareth Evans, Martin Davies 
and Christopher Peacocke who argue that speakers had tacit knowledge 
of a semantic theory for their public languages.6 But the claim Devitt 
focuses on is the claim that language is the system of rules encoded in 
the mind. (If this is right, what are the rules rules of?) We are then told 
that the grammar (theorist’s sense) is theorising about the represented 
rules. So the grammar is not a theory of the language unless we accept 
the equation of the language with the rules of the language. And since 
the grammar (theorist’s sense) is also mentally represented, speakers 
are tacitly theorising about their own mentally represented rules. This 
is way off track––the rules as mentally represented comprise the men-
tally represented grammar (psychological sense), they are not the sub-
ject of another mentally represented grammar (theorist’s sense). The 
embodied rules are not what a psychologically real grammar ‘theorises’ 
about, even if grammar is psychological real. Devitt fails to heed Chom-
sky’s explicit distinction between the theorist’s notion of grammar and 
the speaker’s internal grammar. The theorist’s grammar is a model of 
the speaker’s grammar, and only the later is internally represented.
We, the theorists, can represent the body of information encoded by 
the speaker, and represent (model) how it issues in intuitive judgements 
by displaying a derivation in a generative grammar. A derivation is 
a logical derivation not a matter of actual processing. The theoretical 
derivation displays the way information about the underlying structure 
of language can issue in pronouncements about particular strings: but 
it is a task for the psycholinguist to tell us how the actual processing 
story goes and how it enables the speaker to arrive at his judgements 
given the linguistic information he possesses.
The rules of a grammar, a syntactic theory, records, in fi nite form, 
the knowledge the speaker has about a language. Once again the theory 
states what the speaker knows but not the form in which speaker knows 
it. And it is not part of the mentalist’s claim to say what form speaker’s 
knowledge takes. The theory states the knowledge the speaker has but 
6 See Evans [1981]; Davies [1987]; Peacocke [1987].
it is not obliged to say how that information is encoded mentally by the 
speaker.
Notice, once again, Devitt assumption: ‘According to Chomsky, on 
our natural interpretation, this competence involves representations of 
the rules of the language.’ (italics mine). He continues:
So those representations determine what expressions the speaker produces 
and understands. According to the point about intuitions, those representa-
tions also determine what the speaker says about those expressions in her 
intuitive judgments. (ibid. 4)
The rules of the language determine the expressions the speaker pro-
duces and understands. Of course, they are not processing rules so ‘de-
termine’ must mean ‘fi xes’ which expressions count as ones the speaker 
could (given some further psychological facts) produce or understand. 
Either we represent rules that fi x the expressions of our language, or 
it is the representations of rules that fi x which expressions belong to 
our language. The representations of the rules also provide the speaker 
with knowledge of the language and enable her to arrive at intuitive 
judgements about expressions generated by those rules. Though, how 
does this square with Devitt’s claim that the speaker ‘has knowledge 
about her I-language’. For if the I-language is the set of rules (in De-
vitt’s terminology) then the speaker doesn’t have knowledge about that: 
her knowledge consists in representation of the I-language (set of rules). 
And what our knowledge consists in cannot also be what that knowl-
edge is about. Once again, something is wildly amiss in Devitt’s setting 
up of the picture he wants to attack. He tells us that 
The linguist produces a “grammar” which is a theory of the I-language. 
That theory, hard-won by the linguist, is precisely what the speaker tacitly 
knows. (4)
But how can that be? The speaker is now said to tacitly know (mentally 
represent) a theory about the set of rules of the language. For even if the 
speaker is said to know the theory, this is a theory about the rules of the 
language. Yet, surely, what the speaker knows, if anything, is the lan-
guage: which expressions count as part of the language as fi xed by the 
rules. And yet, on the picture Devitt attacks, this consists of knowing 
the rules of the language. But in the picture Devitt gives us in the above 
quote, the speaker stands at one remove still, knowing not the language 
or its rules, but a theory about the rules of the language. A speaker’s 
knowledge or competence cannot consist in knowing the rules if that 
knowledge is also about the rules. If it is knowledge about the rules of 
the language, analogous to the linguist’s knowledge (about those rules), 
then speaker’s knowledge cannot consist in represented rules. The men-
talist’s claim is that speakers somehow encode the rules of their lan-
guage, and the question is: how do they encode them? But if we are now 
saying that speakers encode a theory about the rules of their language, 
we would fi nd ourselves asking a different question about how speakers 
succeed in encoding the theoretical statements about rules: a question at 
one remove from the one about rules pressed earlier.
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A more ‘natural interpretation’ is available. The I-language stud-
ied by the linguist is the speaker’s grammar. And the grammar (in the 
theorist’s sense) models the grammar (in the psychological sense) of the 
speaker. When we say the speaker knows the grammar we are saying 
no more than this. Compare, Michael Dummett’s claim that a speaker 
has implicit knowledge of a theory of meaning when that theory is a the-
oretical representation of a practical capacity, a theoretical representa-
tion organised in deductive form as a set of propositions.7 According to 
Dummett, we don’t have to say speakers have propositional knowledge 
of the theory: the propositions of the theory represent the knowledge the 
speaker has which consists in a number of interrelated abilities. The 
theory segments the overall practical ability into component abilities 
and matches each proposition of the theory with an ability the speaker 
possesses. This is not the picture Chomsky favours but it shows yet an-
other way of relating speakers and theories of what they know without 
supposing, implausibly, that speakers mentally represent these theo-
ries of their own linguistic knowledge. 
6. Access
Consider Devitt’s further point about how knowledge determines speak-
er’s intuitions—their intuitive linguistic judgements. In ascribing to 
Chomsky the view that speakers have propositional knowledge of rules 
of their grammars, Devitt claims that this knowledge not only enables 
them to produce and understand expressions but ‘those representations 
also determine what the speaker says about those expressions in her in-
tuitive judgments’. How are speakers able to do this? We hear that: ‘sim-
ply in virtue of being competent, speakers have propositional knowledge 
of syntactic facts; their competence gives them “privileged access” to 
this ‘reality’, and ‘intuitions refl ect the underlying representations of 
the rules of the language.’ (4). Can this be right? To begin with, ‘privi-
leged access’ is a matter of having fi rst-person, conscious knowledge of 
our mental states, and as far as I know, no-one (not even Devitt, see 96) 
wants to claim that we have privileged access to the reality of the rules 
of our sub-personal linguistic system. So talk of intuitions refl ecting ‘the 
underlying representations of the rules of the language’ cannot mean 
that we have privileged access to the rules. But nor do we have privi-
leged access to ‘the syntactic facts of the language’ if these are meant 
to be in line with the immediate outputs of the language faculty. If we 
did the task of the linguist would be much easier. They could simply 
ask speakers what the syntactic facts of their language were, or engage 
in introspection about the syntax of their own languages. But linguistic 
theorising is not like this. Speakers’ intuitions do not give us access to 
what our internal linguistic system delivers—the syntactic facts. In-
stead, the linguist relies on speakers’ conscious intuitions about accept-
7 Dummett [1993], 132.
able or unacceptable forms of expression—acceptable or unacceptable 
for the speaker—that provide evidence about the syntactic facts of the 
speaker’s language, from which the linguist tries to formulate generali-
sations in terms of grammatical constraints or principles that will apply 
to all expressions of that language. These can be tested by consulting 
further intuitions of the speaker that either confi rm or infi rm the pre-
dictions about structure made by the theorist. The only privileged ac-
cess speakers have is to their own linguistic intuitions about particular 
sentence forms — acceptable strings. They are generally authoritative 
(though not infallible) about the grammatical properties of their lan-
guages.
7. Respect
A further problem for the exposition of Chomsky is Devitt’s assumption 
that ‘To be competent in a language is to be able to produce and under-
stand the expressions of that language’. This is to treat competence as 
an ability to speak and understand. But this is a mistake as Chomsky 
himself has frequently stressed. The use and understanding of expres-
sions are performance matters. Competence issues in performance as me-
diated by other cognitive capacities, such as memory, attention, auditory 
perception and motor control. And since competence helps to give rise to 
performance, it cannot consist in it. Competence is just one factor among 
others responsible for our ability to produce and understand expressions, 
it informs our production and comprehension of speech.8 Devitt appears 
to acknowledges Chomsky’s view that competence leads to performance 
both in a footnote (5, fn.4) and when he says of a speaker ‘What role does 
her knowledge of the language play in understanding and producing ex-
pressions of the language?’ (4) Though it is of course much easier to reject 
the view that competence is knowledge-involving if you think that com-
petence just is the ability to understand and produce expressions. What 
gives rise to this ability, why is it so systematic in its workings, how does 
it equip us to produce and understand indefi nitely many new sentences 
just as easily as we use and understand familiar ones? Under pressure, 
Devitt, admits that the linguist’s grammar describes ‘what the competent 
speaker knows’ (not just the ability). Speakers’ knowledge is articulated 
in the grammar by linguistic structure rules, and ‘the speaker behaves 
as if those linguistic structure rules were psychologically real in her, as 
if she embodied them’ (ibid. 25). The ‘as if’ talk is necessary, according to 
Devitt, to register the fact that a correct theory (grammar) of the lan-
guage is one that is respected by the speaker’s competence:
A theory of the competence must posit a psychological state that respects the 
8 Chomsky has pointed out that certain speech impairments may lead one 
temporarily to lose the ability to produce and comprehend expressions without losing 
one’s competence. Competence may still be intact, and eventually issue once again in 
speech after a time.
450 B. Smith, Why We Still Need Knowledge of Language  B. Smith, Why We Still Need Knowledge of Language 451
rules governing the linguistic outputs. And a theory of the linguistic outputs 
must posit rules that are respected by the competence and its processing 
rules [parser] (ibid. 25)
This is the minimal position on psychological reality: ‘there is an un-
controversial minimal position that is committed only to there being a 
psychological reality that “respects” the linguistic structure rules’:
[We] ‘know something substantial about a person when we know there is 
something-we-know-not-what within her that respects the rich and compli-
cated structure rules of a certain natural language’ (25)
But now the looming question is this: how does our cognitive organisa-
tion respect linguistic structure? How does competence—a mere abil-
ity of one who may be totally ignorant of the language—succeed in re-
specting the rules of the language? How can a psychological state in us 
be sensitive to linguistic structure and to the constraints on linguistic 
structure without in some way representing the linguistic properties 
and their distributions among the expressions it handles? After all, 
what we encounter perceptually are sounds. Whatever story we have 
about its sensitivity to, and respect for, structure, there must be a mech-
anism for fi nding those differences in structure between ‘John is easy to 
please’ and ‘John is eager to please’ and between ‘John promised Peter 
to go’ and ‘John persuaded Peter to go’ that treats as structured the 
strings of sounds or marks it responds to. And:
The only serious theory anyone has ever proposed about how a brain can be 
sensitive to grammatical, phonological and semantic categories is a compu-
tational/representational theory (a “CRTT”), which posits computations over 
representations of those categories. It’s very hard to see how this could be 
paraphrased away without loss of explanatory force. (Rey [2005], 471)
The only way in which we, or the unconscious apparatus at work in 
us that responds to other people’s speech sounds, can be sensitive to 
phonological, grammatical and semantic categories is due to our having 
the means to assign those categories mentally, or call upon them, in the 
course of cognitive information processing of (certain) speech sounds. 
Internal or intermediate objects of processing are required to explain 
our sensitivity to these unobservable linguistic entities. The linguis-
tic phenomena the listener hears, depend on the linguistic object the 
listener’s internal apparatus supplies in response to speech sounds en-
countered. Competence in a language is having the means to make use 
of linguistic objects with the appropriate, related properties specifi ed by 
the linguist’s theory of grammar. We automatically respond to certain 
speech sounds with a linguistic percept having properties not locatable 
in the sounds (acoustic signals). In response to the limited sensory input 
utterances of speech sounds provides, the mind constructs a rich, syntac-
tically structured, interpreted sentence. How does our cognition—what 
we have within us—enable us to do this? Whatever it is, it must deal 
with information about recursive structures the grammar provides, for 
these are not found in the external environment. And yet, Devitt clings 
to the view that competence somehow engages with an independently 
existing linguistic reality. The Respect Constraint tells us that:
The competence of the speaker/hearer must respect the rules ascribed to 
linguistic reality by the grammar.
But if the competence of the speaker/hearer must respect ‘the rules as-
cribed to linguistic reality’ then we could study the structure of linguis-
tic reality by studying the speaker/hearer’s competence. Initially, this 
may seem to be an indirect route, but given the diffi culty of locating 
linguistic reality, wherever it is supposed to be, or of gaining access to 
it unfi ltered through the competence of the speaker/hearer that tells us 
what its available forms are, there seems to be no other choice. What 
would provide a more direct route to studying linguistic reality? Either 
one could use one’s own competence to select the acceptable forms of 
the language, or one would simply study actual use––linguistic perfor-
mance. But there is a well-known reason why we don’t study actual out-
put only. It is messy, full of false starts, uncompleted utterances, slips of 
the tongue, interruptions, and speaker/hearers would not always take 
what they uttered to be a true refl ection of what they would say under 
good performance conditions. So, instead, we ask them to consult their 
intuitions about the data presented to them. These judgements give us 
cleaner data but also give us something more in accord with their com-
petence. By getting at the constraints respected by competence, we get 
at the rules that govern the linguistic reality competence creates and 
makes available to them. 
In the fi nal analysis, accepting the Respect Constraint is a way of 
admitting that the study of outputs will be perfectly aligned with de-
liverances of a competence theory while remaining lily-livered about 
the psychological reality commitments—as the ‘as if’ talk shows. How-
ever, the important point is that since there is no direct access to the 
language, no way of getting at the syntactic properties of a language 
that its speakers must respect without eliciting the data from enough 
linguistic intuitions to fashion a theory of the full extent and nature of 
speakers’ competence, the Respect Constraint will be trivially met and 
the study of outputs will be the study of the psychological properties of 
speakers’ mind/brains that assign form and content to the signs and 
sounds they encounter.
In what way can Devitt avoid triviality? What can he tell us about 
the psychological states and what it respects? In a fair and concessive 
passage, he allows that perhaps:
The grammar is descriptive of competence in a way stronger than simply 
positing rules that are respected by competence but weaker than positing 
rules that govern processing or are used as data in processing (ibid. 83)
I would agree. The mechanisms in the speaker/hearer must not only con-
form to the linguistic generalisations given by the theory of the gram-
mar. But the stronger position of the mentalist is that the cognitive or-
ganisation and mechanisms of the speaker/hearer do not only satisfy the 
generalisations, but by making them available they are the source of the 
linguistic generalisations. The generalisations hold in virtue of these cog-
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nitive psychological facts about the speaker/hearer about the representa-
tion not of rules but of the structures the rules determine. The facts about 
languages cannot be identifi ed independently of their speaker/hearers. 
They are dependent on the generalisations speaker-hearers’ representa-
tions of structure can sustain. Without this dependence why would the 
syntactic properties of natural language expressions be respected by 
psychological states of speaker-hearers? In answer, Devitt speculates:
Humans are predisposed to learn languages that conform to the rules speci-
fi ed by UG because those rules are, largely if not entirely, innate structure 
rules of thought. (273)
But unlike the rigorously specifi ed principles of UG, which, together 
with an account of the possibilities of parametric variation left open by 
the principles, explain the differences between languages, there is sim-
ply no account of the structure rules of thought. There is no explanation 
of why they would have to take the special, idiosyncratic and largely 
unchanging course linguistic structure rules do, or of how they operate 
in the same way across people with different levels of intelligence, expo-
sure to speech, and background cultures. Devitt’s unsupported assump-
tion that we should replace the innate principles of UG which govern 
the initial confi guration of the language faculty in all speakers by some 
(unspecifi ed) set of innate structure rules of thought appears to be a 
desperate attempt to avoid the Chomskian conclusions at all cost. Alas, 
the savings are far from obvious.
7. Chomsky’s Reality
There is considerable distance between Chomsky’s offi cial view and the 
position Devitt attributes to him, but ironically the real Chomsky is 
dangerously close to the ignorance claim since it denies that speakers 
have knowledge of a language. 
As we have seen, according to Chomsky, language is in the mind:
Linguistics is simply that part of psychology that is concerned with one 
specifi c class of steady states, the cognitive structures that are employed in 
speaking and understanding. (Chomsky [1975b], 160)
Languages are not represented by our internal system, nor do we have 
to pair speakers to languages. Speakers have a linguistic capacity or 
infi nite competence because of their innate endowment of universal 
grammar and their initial exposure to data: data that don’t determine 
their ‘language’ or I-language, as the poverty of stimulus arguments 
tell us. Language, as now understood by the linguist, is the internal 
mechanism that enables us speak and understand: a very different no-
tion of language from that Devitt works with. Consider the following 
from Chomsky:
…what should we take as a language…? The natural choice is g, the genera-
tive procedure; thus a person who knows language L has a specifi ed method 
for interpreting arbitrary expressions, such as [‘Who do you think that John 
saw’ and ‘What do you wonder who saw’, ‘Who do you wonder what saw’, ‘He 
likes John’, ‘His mother likes John’, ‘John likes him’, ‘John’s mother likes 
him’, J (a sentence of Japanese) ] Let us call gE the I-language that some 
particular speaker of English (Jones) has acquired. (Chomsky [1987], 181)
The generative procedure applies to representations in the mind, but 
these are representations in the sense of data structures, not represen-
tations with contents about something external to the speaker. 
[W]hat could such contents be possibly true of? There is, as it were, nothing 
to get right. Languages are not external objects we can go right or wrong 
about….The languages we end up with will refl ect, along certain narrow 
parameters, our initial experience, but we do not end up representing (or 
misrepresenting) that experience. The complex grammatical principles and 
features are just not in the data; that’s the very point of the poverty of stimu-
lus arguments’ (Collins [2004], 514)
The speaker’s language faculty does not represent the speaker’s lan-
guage, or its grammatical structure. Gone is the view of ‘the language 
faculty generat[ing] grammars that are true of languages’, and ‘As go 
E-languages, so go grammars as things which might represent them’:
Chomsky understands ‘language’ to be the internal fi nite generative proce-
dure that accounts for our linguistic competence.’ So construed I-languages 
are ‘internal states of our individual language faculties’. ….An I-language 
is not an independent ‘object’––a set of propositions––that is represented/
known by a speaker-hearer; it just is a state of the speaker/hearer….The 
language faculty [and grammar] is not represented by the mind/brain; it is 
an aspect of the mind/brain. (ibid. 517) 
This surely puts Chomsky beyond the target range of Devitt’s criticisms. 
But notice now we are in danger of losing our grip on there being any 
such thing as a speaker’s knowledge of language either on Devitt’s view 
or on the orthodox Chomskian’s view.9 Of course we do not end up repre-
senting our initial linguistic experience, nor are the complex grammati-
cal phenomena in the data. And I agree with Collins that languages are 
not external objects, however this does not licence the idea that there 
is nothing linguistically speaking that we can go right or wrong about, 
or that we cannot have knowledge of language. The linguistic struc-
tures we deal with are internally generated and assigned to sounds and 
marks which otherwise carry no linguistic information.10 So what can 
we be said to have knowledge of?
9 I take the orthodox Chomskian view to be ably represented by Collins.
10 Even words are not, so to speak, ‘out there’. Each item counts as a word only 
when it carries its full freight of phonological, syntactic, and semantic properties, and 
these are assigned by the language faculty of the speaker, not found in the world as 
the poverty of stimulus arguments establish.
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9. Keeping Knowledge of Language
If knowledge of language is a state of the person and the language a 
person speaks is constituted by that state it is hardly knowledge that is 
at issue: for how can a genuine state of knowledge constitute the thing 
known? Knowledge requires there to be a subject matter we can be right 
or wrong about. And the trouble with the linguist’s notion of knowledge-
of-language, or I-language, is that it fi xes the properties of the language 
rather than conforming to them. The problem for the mentalist in a nut-
shell is this: if the psychological states that constitute one’s competence 
determine the facts about one’s language, how can those same psycho-
logical states be at the same time answerable to those facts in the way 
knowledge requires? This is what I have called elsewhere ‘The Missing 
Object of Knowledge Problem’.11 And there had better be a solution to it 
if we are to claim that speakers do have knowledge of language and that 
this domain of knowledge constitutes the subject matter of linguistics.
Briefl y, the solution I favour can be given along the following lines. 
Our linguistic intuitions are immediate judgements, not based on ob-
servation or evidence; they are simply internal responses to the sounds 
or signs we are presented with. They are fi rst-personal conscious opin-
ions about the acceptability or naturalness of certain stings of words 
(or phonemes). These linguistic intuitions provide evidence of linguistic 
facts. But how can judgements not based on any evidence give us objec-
tive linguistic knowledge? The answer is that there will be sub-personal 
facts about the language faculty involved in producing (giving form and 
character to) our intuitions: the language faculty dictates the structures 
assigned. And when speakers’ intuitions are in step with these inter-
nal assignments they will count as knowledge. It is when our linguistic 
intuitions track the workings of the underlying linguistic system and 
the syntactic structures it assigns, that our intuitions amount to knowl-
edge. But what do they give us knowledge of? Although it may seem as if 
they gives us knowledge of what is produced and going on around us in 
our linguistic environment, actually, linguistic experience, like linguis-
tic intuition, is only giving us knowledge of our own internal system’s 
workings: the system which fi xes the properties of all expressions of 
our languages. It can seem as though we were judging the acceptability 
(‘okay for me’) of sentences ‘out there’, as part of the language. But in 
fact we are responding to something in our own breast. There is nothing 
‘out there’ but sounds and signs. The language that I speak is consti-
tuted by the internal system in me that assigns structure to the sounds 
and signs I encounter and produce. Language is essentially structured 
and the structure is internal to speakers’ minds. And although this is 
not the face value phenomenology of our intuitive linguistic judgements 
(and it is good question what our phenomenology does present us with 
either with respect to the location of language or speech sounds) there 
11 See Smith [2006a] in Lepore and Smith [2006].
is an object of knowledge in the case of grammar. And since linguistic 
intuitions provide each of us with objective knowledge they furnish us 
with a subject matter for linguistics: the study of the individual’s gram-
matical knowledge; the grammar of that person’s idiolect.
10. Understanding Other People’s Use of Language
A problem we still face with the view of language as individual and in-
ternal is explaining how we succeed in communicating with others. How 
can the assignments I make to the sounds I encounter, and what I hear 
them as saying ensure knowledge of another’s linguistic meaning? I rely 
(inter alia) on my knowledge of grammar and my knowledge of word 
meaning. And while I am authoritative about what I mean by words, and 
about which word strings are grammatical, I am not authoritative about 
what you mean or what is grammatical for you. Notice, though, that I 
do not typically have trouble understanding others. I do not fi rst hear 
sounds and then have to hypothesize about the linguistic signifi cance 
others attach to those sounds. It cannot be like that: we simply speak 
and expect to be understood; we listen and respond without hypothesis. 
We hear sounds as meaningful. I hear the sound of what is being said as 
structured, and if it is not a structure of my grammar, it will be heard 
as deviant but intelligible––if I can re-arrange the words heard. The 
way communication works, I have to make something of the sounds you 
emit. But what meanings do I hear your words as having? This will not 
be a matter of sub-personal assignments by my language faculty. Word 
meanings do not belong in the language faculty: knowledge of word 
meaning is conscious and fi rst-personal. And the meanings I hear your 
words as having are the meanings those words have consciously for me; 
they are the meanings I have managed to endow those sounds with 
in my early acquisition of word meaning. The default assumption—not 
even explicitly entertained—will be that you mean by your words what 
I mean by them; indeed the default is that this is what anyone means by 
this word.12 (Later experience will provide plenty of evidence that this is 
not always the case and that the default must be overridden.) Because 
the conditions of learning take place in a common, shared environment, 
the meaning we attach to a word will be what others from whom we 
learned the word mean by it. And provided there is enough overlap 
within and between linguistic communities this will secure the useful-
ness of the default assumption and the entitlement to claim to know 
what others mean. The default assumption can be overridden, of course: 
others can use words with meanings different from the ones we attach 
to these sounds. Nevertheless, at fi rst, we hear sounds as meaningful 
according to the language we each speak. That language is fi xed by our 
knowledge of language. This consists (inter alia) in knowledge of gram-
mar and knowledge of word meaning. Knowledge of grammar is knowl-
edge of linguistic facts internal to our language faculty. Knowledge of 
12 For more on this see Smith [2006b] and [2006c].
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word meaning is default knowledge of meanings that others too attach 
to these words; everything else is deliberative interpretation. We have 
knowledge of language but what we know when we know a language is 
not a single thing. It consists of different kinds of knowledge and dif-
ferent objects of knowledge. Some objects of our linguistic knowledge 
are mental and internal, some depend on our dealings with others and 
aspects of the environment. There is no single locus of linguistic signifi -
cance, but through the joint exercise of our cognitive abilities we come 
to have a unifi ed experience of the linguistic signifi cance of speech. It 
may be that experience misleads Devitt about the nature and location 
of language and encourages him to attempt to dispense with knowledge 
of language. However, we will still need knowledge of language in the 
picture in order to understand our experience of language. The science 
of language may discard our ordinary notions but it still needs to retain 
the notion of knowledge of language. 
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